Webinar
February 26
Better SOC with Interactive Sandbox
Practical Use Cases
SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader that uses multi-stage execution to deliver secondary payloads. It supports system discovery, screenshot capture, persistence through scheduled tasks, C2 communication, and anti-analysis techniques.
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Loader
Type
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Unknown
Origin
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1 June, 2023
First seen
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24 September, 2026
Last seen
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Type
:
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Unknown
Origin
:
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1 June, 2023
First seen
:
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24 September, 2026
Last seen
:
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Payload Delivery: SmartLoader is a malware loader used to deliver and execute additional payloads.
System Fingerprinting: SmartLoader collects information about the compromised Windows environment.
IP and Geolocation Discovery: The loader can obtain public IP and geolocation information.
Network Communication: SmartLoader communicates with external infrastructure to support its operation.
Loader Functionality: SmartLoader can serve as an initial stage for delivering and executing additional malware.
ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox analysis reveals a sequence involving command-script execution, system fingerprinting, public IP and geolocation discovery, and subsequent network communication.
SmartLoader detonated inside ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox
SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader designed to execute additional components while collecting information about the compromised environment.
The analyzed sample is distributed as a ZIP archive containing the files required for execution. Its observed execution begins with a command script that launches the loader executable and passes a configuration-related file as an argument.
During execution, SmartLoader performs basic host profiling and gathers system identifiers before communicating with external infrastructure. The observed sample also retrieves public IP and geolocation information, providing the operator with additional context about the infected system.
SmartLoader's behavior can therefore be summarized as a relatively short chain involving command-script execution, system fingerprinting, external IP discovery, and C2-related network communication.
A SmartLoader infection can create several business risks, such as:
SmartLoader attacks Windows systems, making organizations that use Windows workstations and endpoints potentially exposed.
The observed behavior does not indicate a restriction to a particular industry. The collection of basic system information and network details can be useful during attacks against a broad range of corporate environments.
Because SmartLoader functions as a loader, activity following its execution may depend on the payloads or instructions associated with a particular sample or campaign.
Observing a SmartLoader sample inside ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox shows a compact execution chain focused on launching the loader, profiling the host, discovering its public network information, and communicating with external infrastructure.
The analyzed sample is delivered in the v2.6-alpha.1.zip archive. After extraction, Application.cmd is launched through Command Prompt and starts util.exe with cert.txt as an argument.
The general execution flow is:
ZIP archive → Application.cmd → util.exe → system profiling → IP/geolocation discovery → network communication
The analyzed SmartLoader sample is delivered as v2.6-alpha.1.zip.
After the archive is extracted, the included command script becomes the starting point for execution.
The use of an archive allows multiple files required by the loader to be packaged together and delivered as a single object.
SmartLoader sample delivered as an archive
The extracted Application.cmd file is launched through Command Prompt. The script starts util.exe with cert.txt provided as an argument:
util.exe cert.txt
This creates the primary execution chain observed in the sandbox:
Application.cmd → util.exe → cert.txt
The command script acts as the initial launcher, while util.exe performs the subsequent SmartLoader activity.
Application.cmd starts util.exe with cert.txt as an argument
Once running, util.exe collects information about the host environment.
Observed checks include:
These values provide SmartLoader with basic identifiers and information about the environment in which it is executing.
The collection of multiple system attributes can also help distinguish individual systems or provide context for subsequent activity.
SmartLoader collecting basic system identifiers
SmartLoader also requests information from ip-api.com/json/.
The request provides public IP and geolocation information associated with the infected system.
This allows the loader to obtain network-level context that may not be available through local system information alone.
SmartLoader checking public IP and geolocation information
After collecting host information, util.exe sends an HTTPS POST request to polygon.drpc.org.
The observed communication demonstrates that the loader contacts external infrastructure after performing its initial system profiling.
The use of HTTPS provides encrypted transport for the network request.
Later, util.exe communicates with 185.10.68.110 over HTTP and sends a POST request to an /api/ path.
ANY.RUN Interactive Sandbox detecting an HTTP POST request as SmartLoader traffic
ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox detects this traffic using the SMARTLOADER has been detected (SURICATA) signature.
The request body is approximately 3.1 MB, and the server responds with HTTP 200.
This network activity represents one of the clearest behavioral indicators associated with the analyzed SmartLoader sample.
No persistence mechanism was observed during the analyzed execution.
Unlike malware families that create scheduled tasks, registry Run keys, services, or other startup mechanisms, this SmartLoader sample remained focused on its immediate execution chain and network activity.
The absence of observed persistence does not necessarily mean that every SmartLoader variant behaves identically. Different samples or campaigns may use different configurations or additional components.
The analyzed sample demonstrates several distinct stages of activity:
SmartLoader samples may differ in their delivery method, configuration, infrastructure, and subsequent payload activity. As a result, relying exclusively on static indicators such as hashes may provide limited visibility into related activity.
ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence can help analysts investigate SmartLoader by connecting observed samples with behavioral indicators, network infrastructure, and previous sandbox executions.
Threat Intelligence Lookup can be used to pivot from a suspicious SmartLoader sample or network indicator toward related activity, including:
Searching for SmartLoader in ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup
Defenders investigating potential SmartLoader activity can monitor for:
These behaviors can help identify SmartLoader activity even when specific filenames, hashes, domains, or IP addresses change between samples.
If SmartLoader is identified on a corporate endpoint, investigate both the loader and any activity that followed its execution.
Recommended actions include:
Because SmartLoader can act as a delivery mechanism for additional malware, removing the initial loader alone may not fully address the compromise.
SmartLoader demonstrates a compact Windows malware execution chain centered on payload delivery, system fingerprinting, public IP discovery, and network communication.
For defenders, monitoring suspicious command-script execution, unusual system profiling, external IP discovery, large outbound POST requests, and unexpected connections from loader processes can provide useful behavioral indicators for identifying SmartLoader activity beyond simple hash-based detection.
SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader that executes additional components while collecting information about the compromised system and communicating with external infrastructure.
SmartLoader can use command scripts or other launch mechanisms to execute its loader components. Its activity may include system discovery, network communication, and delivery of additional payloads.
SmartLoader can gather information about the Windows environment, including system identifiers, configuration details, security settings, and network information such as public IP and geolocation data.
Yes. SmartLoader can communicate with attacker-controlled or otherwise associated external infrastructure to support its operation and potentially facilitate additional payload delivery.
Persistence may vary between SmartLoader samples. Some variants or associated payloads may use persistence mechanisms, while others may focus on short-term execution and payload delivery.
Interactive sandboxing allows analysts to observe SmartLoader behavior in a controlled environment, including execution chains, system discovery, network activity, and potential payload delivery.
Threat intelligence can then help connect these indicators with related samples and infrastructure.