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IOCs

Zloader is a banking trojan that uses webinjects and VNC clients to still banking credentials. This Trojan is based on leaked code from 2011, but despite its age, Zloader’s popularity has been only increasing through early 2020, when it relied on COVID-19 themed attacks.

Banking trojan
Type
Unknown
Origin
1 May, 2016
First seen
18 August, 2026
Last seen
Also known as
Terdot
Zbot
DELoader

How to analyze Zloader with ANY.RUN

Banking trojan
Type
Unknown
Origin
1 May, 2016
First seen
18 August, 2026
Last seen

IOCs

IP addresses
23.52.181.141
48.209.6.48
74.178.240.61
40.126.32.74
172.211.123.250
135.232.92.97
2.16.164.120
95.100.102.101
48.192.1.65
57.153.246.3
88.221.169.205
135.232.92.137
20.190.159.128
48.209.133.15
2.16.164.49
48.209.138.189
23.11.41.157
135.233.95.135
23.59.18.102
135.233.95.144
Hashes
fc9983cc6571001525859be91c1d188365d5755de010cb90f9f48e0c690ee40a
86dabeeabd4268be6ad7f053b7a1f5148464a58a4ddfd75091e1e09f988ffea0
74d955f8200fc650be9239176da0f774e2e6d01265ed5920a25c06e0df7c092f
54d8c9cfdfaa4def013260dd34f6da0120ffe1f1f58f32b2904502a9deee228b
92c1ed03759ba004b3165337f2fad06dee662ad807d8e0ed89c4bdb79d4a89b7
00e54592ac0790d4fd0a82c0cc0c1cba70265db1a378c7a048c6353495c41e66
a4f83eb5b5936f23b02666f703ad7ec15e816fbf752452705efd1d2289772f0d
3b6a3fa1b44f75a2b27d033e7cd33571f97e919c93b40f436c01b982b62a780a
ed3010c7069665557c0566384971b76dc7386dac22cecc6c43ee3b274fee2011
6373536537905012df3cca688b3b2f45c40de83fbc522101670cb039e6e7ee83
3082be10cc015767db23696bc716ed5f3ae53d1a25e257e0811faad91f7c2abf
dea2d23477a9fea8baa18e8be65be137489cb7b0a8fc5b527a60770c3b081d8c
e530eaa8a8937514714426cd7c989d64343fd9a0360972e23279a73ee03d0a70
a93b1f9c83c5808b9de90a427a9c1400e21e9e49b0822d878a2259a9f0548e1b
e771e53116599a93d67d904f1e067452d89e75a9fe032bf35879befce7e55c0e
2260882f12a2d97273c9f83bcab6b330a873666223e44c22f44c4f53efd9ba3c
f6a13279c9857c63633289b873b41181d459c7da751f62f43e795179ae94ed8b
f4caed5f38e269a84d583267662a9aa1952bf9c41a949268e42f2463f5fb868f
80092b078bdfa49fc30e0bfd7e1d16e530ab0a74a40540cb5b458bcb1a0b3659
ca44d113a270f53e6dd72b08aa656e76eda1e8aeaf0e88f5294793968f4ffeaf
Domains
crl.microsoft.com
go.microsoft.com
fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
google.com
settings-win.data.microsoft.com
activation-v2.sls.microsoft.com
slscr.update.microsoft.com
client.wns.windows.com
www.microsoft.com
login.live.com
ocsp.digicert.com
nexusrules.officeapps.live.com
self.events.data.microsoft.com
ecs.office.com
ctldl.windowsupdate.com
v10.events.data.microsoft.com
mrodevicemgr.officeapps.live.com
dns.msftncsi.com
www.bing.com
arc.msn.com
URLs
https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2257403&clcid=0x409
https://login.live.com/rst2.srf
https://login.live.com/ppsecure/deviceaddcredential.srf
https://slscr.update.microsoft.com/sls/%7b522d76a4-93e1-47f8-b8ce-07c937ad1a1e%7d/x64/10.0.19045.4046/0?ch=686&l=en-us&p=&pt=0x30&wua=10.0.19041.3996&mk=dell&md=dell
http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microoceraut2011_2011_03_22.crl
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/microsoft%20time-stamp%20pca%202010(1).crl
http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microoceraut_2010-06-23.crl
https://fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com/clientwebservice/ping
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/microsoft%20ecc%20update%20signing%20ca%202.2.crl
https://slscr.update.microsoft.com/sls/ping
https://slscr.update.microsoft.com/sls/%7be7a50285-d08d-499d-9ff8-180fdc2332bc%7d/x64/10.0.19045.4046/0?ch=686&l=en-us&p=&pt=0x30&wua=10.0.19041.3996&mk=dell&md=dell
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/microsoft%20ecc%20update%20signing%20ca%202.1.crl
http://ocsp.digicert.com/mfewtzbnmeswstajbgurdgmcgguabbq50otx%2fh0ztl%2bz8sipi7wewvxdlqqutijuibiv5unu5g%2f6%2brks7qyxjzkceaz1vqyrvgl0erhqlcpm8gy%3d
https://settings-win.data.microsoft.com/settings/v3.0/wsd/waasassessment?os=windows&osver=10.0.19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-&ring=retail&sku=48&deviceclass=windows.desktop&locale=en-us&deviceid=bad99146-31d3-4ec6-a1a4-be76f32ba5d4&flightring=retail&telemetrylevel=1&hidovergattreg=c%3a%5cwindows%5csystem32%5cdriverstore%5cfilerepository%5chidbthle.inf_amd64_9610b4821fdf82a5%5cmicrosoft.bluetooth.profiles.hidovergatt.dll&appver=10.0&processoridentifier=amd64%20family%2023%20model%201%20stepping%202&oemmodel=dell&updateoffereddays=4294967295&processormanufacturer=authenticamd&installdate=1661339444&oemmodelbaseboard=&branchreadinesslevel=cb&oemsubmodel=j5cr&isclouddomainjoined=0&deferfeatureupdateperiodindays=30&isdeviceretaildemo=0&flightingbranchname=&osuilocale=en-us&devicefamily=windows.desktop&wuclientver=10.0.19041.3996&uninstallactive=1&isflightingenabled=0&osskuid=48&processorclockspeed=3094&totalphysicalram=6144&securebootcapable=0&app=waasassessment&processorcores=6&currentbranch=vb_release&installlanguage=en-us&deferqualityupdateperiodindays=0&servicingbranch=cb&oemname_uncleaned=dell&tpmversion=0&primarydisktotalcapacity=262144&installationtype=client&attrdataver=186&processormodel=amd%20ryzen%205%203500%206-core%20processor&isedgewithchromiuminstalled=1&osversion=10.0.19045.4046&ismdmenrolled=0&activationchannel=retail&honorwufbdeferrals=0&firmwareversion=a.40&trendinstalledkey=1&osarchitecture=amd64&defaultuserregion=244&updatemanagementgroup=2
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/micsecserca2011_2011-10-18.crl
https://settings-win.data.microsoft.com/settings/v3.0/onesettings/client?osversionfull=10.0.19045.4046.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406&localdeviceid=s%3abad99146-31d3-4ec6-a1a4-be76f32ba5d4&flightring=retail&attrdataver=186&osuilocale=en-us&osskuid=48&app=wosc&appver=&isflightingenabled=0&telemetrylevel=1&devicefamily=windows.desktop
https://settings-win.data.microsoft.com/settings/v3.0/flightsettings/fsservice?processorclockspeed=3094&isretailos=1&oemmanufacturername=dell&flightingpolicyvalue=3&enablepreviewbuilds=4294967295&osversionfull=10.0.19045.4046.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406&managepreviewbuilds=3&branchreadinesslevelsource=0&attrdataver=186&processorcores=6&branchreadinesslevelraw=16&totalphysicalram=6144&tpmversion=0&oemmodelnumber=dell&systemvolumetotalcapacity=260281&deviceid=s%3abad99146-31d3-4ec6-a1a4-be76f32ba5d4&app=fss&appver=10.0&smartactivehoursstate=1&activehoursstart=20&securebootcapable=0&activehoursend=13&devicefamily=windows.desktop
https://settings-win.data.microsoft.com/settings/v3.0/wsd/muse?processorclockspeed=3094&flightids=&updateoffereddays=4294967295&branchreadinesslevel=cb&oemmanufacturername=dell&isclouddomainjoined=0&processoridentifier=amd64%20family%2023%20model%201%20stepping%202&sku=48&activationchannel=retail&attrdataver=186&ismdmenrolled=0&processorcores=6&processormodel=amd%20ryzen%205%203500%206-core%20processor&totalphysicalram=6144&primarydisktype=4294967295&flightingbranchname=&chassistypeid=1&oemmodelnumber=dell&systemvolumetotalcapacity=260281&sampleid=95271487&deviceclass=windows.desktop&app=muse&disabledualscan=0&appver=10.0&oemsubmodel=j5cr&locale=en-us&isalwaysonalwaysconnectedcapable=0&ms=0&defaultuserregion=244&updateserviceurl=http%3a%2f%2fneverupdatewindows10.com&osver=10.0.19045.4046.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406&os=windows&deviceid=s%3abad99146-31d3-4ec6-a1a4-be76f32ba5d4&deferqualityupdateperiodindays=0&ring=retail&deferfeatureupdateperiodindays=30
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/microsoft%20ecc%20update%20secure%20server%20ca%202.1.crl
https://settings-win.data.microsoft.com/settings/v3.0/wsd/updatehealthtools?os=windows&osver=10.0.19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-&sku=48&deviceclass=windows.desktop&locale=en-us&deviceid=s:bad99146-31d3-4ec6-a1a4-be76f32ba5d4&sampleid=s:95271487&appver=10.0.19041.3626&flightring=retail&telemetrylevel=1&hidovergattreg=c%3a%5cwindows%5csystem32%5cdriverstore%5cfilerepository%5chidbthle.inf_amd64_9610b4821fdf82a5%5cmicrosoft.bluetooth.profiles.hidovergatt.dll&appver=&processoridentifier=amd64%20family%2023%20model%201%20stepping%202&oemmodel=dell&updateoffereddays=4294967295&processormanufacturer=authenticamd&installdate=1661339444&oemmodelbaseboard=&branchreadinesslevel=cb&oemsubmodel=j5cr&isclouddomainjoined=0&deferfeatureupdateperiodindays=30&isdeviceretaildemo=0&flightingbranchname=&osuilocale=en-us&devicefamily=windows.desktop&wuclientver=10.0.19041.3996&uninstallactive=1&isflightingenabled=0&osskuid=48&processorclockspeed=3094&totalphysicalram=6144&securebootcapable=0&app=sedimentpack&processorcores=6&currentbranch=vb_release&installlanguage=en-us&deferqualityupdateperiodindays=0&oemname_uncleaned=dell&tpmversion=0&primarydisktotalcapacity=262144&installationtype=client&attrdataver=186&processormodel=amd%20ryzen%205%203500%206-core%20processor&isedgewithchromiuminstalled=1&osversion=10.0.19045.4046&ismdmenrolled=0&activationchannel=retail&firmwareversion=a.40&trendinstalledkey=1&osarchitecture=amd64&defaultuserregion=244&updatemanagementgroup=2
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What is Zloader?

Zloader, also known as Terdot and Zbot is a banking trojan. It uses web injects to steal passwords and auth codes of its victims. The trojan was first spotted in 2016 but it has seen a sudden surge of activity in the winter of 2019, appearing in over 100 email campaigns.

Zloader is constructed using the leaked code of the well-known ZeuS malware. ZeuS code was made public in 2011 and became a base for various malware samples. The fact that its variants are still being used goes to show how effective the original malware was.

General description of Zloader malware

Researchers first observed Zloader, also known at the time as DELoader, in 2016, when it started attacking Canadian banking organizations. The malware’s name highlights two facts: the letter “Z” shows that it is based on the Zeus Banking Trojan and the word “loader” highlights the malware’s unique design. Zloader makes its way into the machines of the victims using a loader that installs the final payload.

Zloader became quite popular and served as the main tool for several hackers, with TA511 also known as Hancitor being the most acknowledged. After working with Zloader for almost 2 years, Hancitor made a jump to Panda Banker. Others soon followed suit and Zloader became abandoned until 2019, when researchers detected a sudden surge of attacks.

Possibly, attackers pursued the opportunity presented with the confusion that surrounds the COVID crisis, launching a new wave of campaigns in December 2019, with the number of sightings only increasing by March 2020.

Although, previously Zloader focused on finding victims in Canada, starting with 2020 it expanded the geography of operations. The newer campaigns attack financial institutions all over the world, including the US, Australia, and Europe.

The malware uses a technique called web injects to trick victims into revealing their authentication codes. Zloader replaces the banking website of the victim with an identical copy fetched from a custom file so that unsuspecting users give away credentials thinking that they are logging into their bank. In reality, the sensitive information, including auth codes, is sent to the C&C controlled by the attackers.

Additionally, Zloader can fetch information from browsers, accessing cookies and passwords — a standard functionality for banking trojans.

Interestingly, the 2019 version of Zloader is less advanced than its predecessor, seen in 2016. Researchers think that it might be a revision of an older iteration of the malware that lacked some of the sophisticated malicious techniques.

Among the missing features are code obfuscation and string encryption — those are both techniques threat actors use to complicated static analysis of malware by making the code unreadable.

However, that does not mean that Zloader should be taken lightly. It's still top-level malware and it is highly dangerous.

For example, if attackers manage to get a hold of the credentials, they use a smart technique to log into the account without raising red flags with the bank. The threat actors log in with a virtual network computing client, so all the bank sees is another session from the normal victim’s machine. This way, not only can attackers withdraw money without raising any alarms but proving that the transaction fraudulence is also difficult.

On top of that, the malware still uses some anti-evasion techniques like Command & Control blacklisting and Windows API function hashing, making the analysis more complicated. Another worrying sign is the constant maintenance of Zloader. No less than 18 versions have been seen circulating in the wild from January to March 2020. The malware is being constantly improved.

Zloader malware analysis

We can watch the complete execution process of Zloader in a video recorded in the ANY.RUN interactive malware hunting service. Moreover, check out other malware analyses such as FlawedAmmyy.

Zloader process graph

Figure 1: Shows the process graph, automatically created in ANY.RUN

Zloader execution process

Zloader usually makes its way into systems as an executable or as a script file. When entering as a script file, it runs and compiles into the library by the wscript process. As an executable file, the malware makes an injection into the msiexec.exe process. After that Zloader tries to connect to Command & Control server over HTTPS to download additional modules.

Zloader distribution

Zloader is distributed to victims with malspam. Emails are crafted to look like government notices or financial support offered due to the COVID-19 epidemic. Attached to emails are malicious files, normally with Microsoft Office file extensions, but PDF files were also observed.

When opened, the files ask the victim to enable macros. If users compile, the macros download a loader that establishes a connection with the command and control server and installs the final payload — Zloader.

How to detect Zloader?

Since Zloader creates registry keys with pseudo-random names under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft and directories with pseudo-random names inside the %APPDATA% directory. This activity can help analysts detect this malware family. To take a look at the registry changes and created directories, just click on the msiexec process and then click on the “More info” button.

Conclusion

Despite being based on code that was leaked no less than 9 years ago, Zloader still poses a massive threat to cybersecurity.

From late 2019, this banking trojan targets financial institutions all around the world with COVID-19 themed attacks. It appeared in over 100 email campaigns after being inactive for nearly 2 years and now wreaks havoc on the banking world, using web injects and VNC sessions to steal credentials.

Thankfully, using ANY.RUN, researchers can analyze Zloader in a secure online environment and take advantage of our interactive sandbox. With our service, malware hunters can get results on the fly, while still being in control of all simulation variables, saving massive time on dynamic analysis. Studying threats like Zloader is a sure way to develop a sound cybersecurity strategy or prepare an action plan should your organization come under attack.

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