LimeRAT Malware Analysis: Extracting the Config

In today’s article, we’re going to look under the hood of a modular RAT — LimeRAT. Let’s get right into it!

What is LimeRat

LimeRAT is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that’s been around for a few years now. It’s a versatile piece of malware designed to give attackers control over an infected system. With its relatively small file size, it tries to fly under the radar of traditional antivirus solutions.

What makes LimeRAT particularly interesting is its ability to perform a wide range of malicious activities. Some of these include keylogging, stealing passwords, and capturing screenshots. Additionally, LimeRAT can execute arbitrary commands, download and upload files, and even use the infected machine for crypto-mining or DDoS attacks.

LimeRAT malware analysis

To start, let’s open a sample in Detect It Easy:

LimeRAT sample overview in DiE — Figure 1: sample overview in DiE

Upon inspection, we observe that the code has been obfuscated (MITRE T1027) and unreadable: the names of classes, methods, and variables are made out of random glyphs.

Since the sample is written in a .NET language, let’s open it in DnSpy.

LimeRAT sample overview in DnSpy — Figure 2: sample overview in DnSpy; note that use of obfuscation techniques

Finding the configuration

After examining the malware’s classes, we find something resembling a class with its configuration:

Possibly, LimeRAT configuration class — Figure 3: possibly, malware configuration class

We notice that this class contains a field that appears to be a string encoded using the Base64 algorithm (MITRE T1132.001):

Strange LimeRAT class field — Figure 4: strange class field that looks like Base64 encoded string

We attempted to decode this string using CyberChef, but were unsuccessful. It is likely that the string is not only encoded but also encrypted.

Unsuccessful attempt to decode LimeRAT string with CyberChef — Figure 5: even though it seems that this string is Base64 encoded, we can’t obtain data by just decoding it

Looks like the string is encoded and encrypted. Therefore, we will attempt to analyze this string and identify any functions or instructions that reference it. To do this, we right-click on the field and select “Analyse” from the context menu (alternatively, we can select the field and use the Ctrl + Shift + R shortcut).

In the resulting window, we are interested in where the value of this string is being read. We expand the “Read by” section and see that the string is being read in two methods:

2 x-refs to the LimeRAT string — Figure 6: two x-refs to the string that we discovered

We briefly inspect the first method but don’t see anything interesting here. It appears that this method is not specifically related to the virus configuration:

LimeRAT failed extraction — Figure 7: the first method seems useless

Let’s move on to the second method. We immediately notice some interesting code where our string is being used with the method WebClient.DownloadString, which is used to download a string from a remote resource.

LimeRAT uses the string in WebClient.DownloadString method — Figure 8: the second x-ref is more interesting – looks like it uses our string in WebClient.DownloadString method

Before our string is passed to WebClient.DownloadString is passed through another method that clearly transforms it into something that DownloadString can consume.

Let’s take a closer look at this method and see what it does to our string.

After a quick evaluation of the method, we see that it uses instances of the RijndaelManaged and MD5CryptoServiceProvider classes.

It appears that we have found the function where our string is decrypted:

LimeRAT's method for string decryption — Figure 9: it seems that we found a method responsible for string decryption

LimeRAT decryption algorithm

Let’s break down how the decryption algorithm works in more detail:

Instances of the RijndaelManaged and MD5CryptoServiceProvider classes are created. If we search for the RijndaelManaged class on MSDN, we see that it is essentially an obsolete implementation of the AES encryption algorithm (MITRE T1027). The MD5CryptoServiceProvider class, as the name implies, is used to compute an MD5 hash.

An array of 32 bytes is created and initialized with zeros. This array will be used to store the AES key.

To generate the key, the MD5 hash of another string from the configuration class is first computed (in our case, the string is “20[.]199.13.167”).

LimeRAT string from the configuration class — Figure 10: another string from the configuration class is used to generate the AES key

Next, the first 15 bytes and then the first 16 bytes of the computed hash are copied to the previously created array. The last element of the array remains zero.

The generated key is set to the key property of the RijndaelManaged instance. The Mode property is set to CipherMode.ECB.

Finally, the original string is decoded using the Base64 algorithm and decrypted using the AES256-ECB algorithm.

Let’s try to replicate this algorithm in CyberChef to confirm our findings. We will need 2 CyberChef tabs, one where we’ll use MD5 to generate the AES key, and another where we’ll attempt to decrypt the data.

First, we calculate the MD5 hash and take 15 bytes from it. Then copy them to the ‘Key’ field in the AES Decrypt section in another tab:

Figure 11: taking first 15 bytes of MD5 hash

copying 15 bytes to ‘Key’ in AES Decrypt section in first tab — Figure 12: copying 15 bytes to ‘Key’ in AES Decrypt section in the first tab

Then, we take the first 16 bytes of MD5 hash:

Figure 13: taking first 16 bytes of MD5 hash

Our next step is to append them to previous 15 bytes and add a zero byte at the end as a padding byte (to 32 bytes):

Figure 14: copying 16 bytes and appending zero to ‘Key’ in AES Decrypt section in first tab

And now we can see the decrypted string in the output section.

You can try the same here as well.

After decrypting the string, we get a link to a PasteBin note: https://pastebin[.]com/raw/sxNJt2ek. When we navigate to the link, we see the C2 address of the malware.

Figure 15: we found LimeRATs C2 using data that we decrypted

Wrapping Up

In this article, we successfully analyzed LimeRAT and uncovered its configuration. We identified the use of the .NET language and examined the malware classes, which revealed that obfuscation had been implemented. By meticulously inspecting these classes, we determined the decryption algorithm employed to decode the string containing the C2 address.

IOCs

Analyzed files:

SHA1	14836dd608efb4a0c552a4f370e5aafb340e2a5d
SHA256	6d08ed6acac230f41d9d6fe2a26245eeaf08c84bc7a66fddc764d82d6786d334
MD5	d36f15bef276fd447e91af6ee9e38b28
SSDEEP	3072:DDiv2GSyn88sH888wQ2wmVgMk/211h36vEcIyNTY4WZd/w1UwIwEoTqPMinXHx+i:XOayy

IPv4:

IOC	Description
20[.]199.13.167:8080	LimeRAT’s C2 server

Domains:

IOC	Description
https://pastebin[.]com/raw/sxNJt2ek	PasteBin used by LimeRAT to hide its original C2 server

MITRE (ARMATTACK):

Tactic	Technique	Description
TA0005: Defense Evasion	T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information	Malware is using obfuscator to strip its method names, class names, etc.
TA0005: Defense Evasion	T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information	Malware uses Base64 algorithm to encode and decode data
TA0005: Defense Evasion	T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information	Malware uses AES algorithm to encrypt and decrypt data

Although effective, this manual process can be time-consuming. This is where interactive sandboxes, such as ANY.RUN, prove to be invaluable.

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hardee

Reverse Engineer, Malware Analyst at ANY.RUN at ANY.RUN | + posts

I contribute to open source from time to time and I am always up for a challenge.

malware malware analysis

hardee

Reverse Engineer, Malware Analyst at ANY.RUN