{"id":22417,"date":"2026-08-04T08:30:51","date_gmt":"2026-08-04T08:30:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/any.run\/cybersecurity-blog\/?p=22417"},"modified":"2026-08-04T09:08:00","modified_gmt":"2026-08-04T09:08:00","slug":"major-cyber-attacks-july-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/any.run\/cybersecurity-blog\/major-cyber-attacks-july-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Major Cyber Attacks in July 2026: US and EU Organizations Hit by Phishing, RATs, and Stealers"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

July 2026 showed how trusted business workflows can quickly turn into account takeover, data exposure, fraud, and persistent access. ANY.RUN<\/a> observed attacks that put cloud accounts, financial processes, sensitive data, and business continuity at risk across the US, Europe, and Brazil. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here are the major attacks from July, the business risks they exposed, and the actions security leaders should prioritize to contain them faster. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What July\u2019s Attacks Revealed About Enterprise Risk <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

July\u2019s attacks showed how easily routine business activity can become a path to account compromise, data exposure, fraud, and operational disruption. Attackers used trusted platforms, legitimate authentication flows, familiar documents, and built-in system tools to reduce suspicion and delay the moment when security teams could confirm the true scale of an incident. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trusted business services created false confidence:<\/strong> SharePoint, OneDrive, Zoom Events, Microsoft authentication pages, and compromised government systems appeared in attack chains. Their presence made malicious activity look more credible and increased the chance that employees or security controls would allow it to continue. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Identity attacks threatened core business workflows:<\/strong> Kratos and Kali365 put Microsoft 365 accounts, corporate email, shared files, supplier communication, and payment conversations at risk. In cases involving active sessions, refresh tokens, or OAuth access, changing a password alone might not fully remove the attacker. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A single endpoint could expose access across the business:<\/strong> DestinyStealer, Banana RAT, DARTHVADER Stealer, and OVERLORD RAT collected or targeted browser credentials, cookies, Outlook data, VPN access, file-transfer accounts, cryptocurrency wallets, and other sensitive information. One infected device could therefore create exposure across several systems and require a much broader response than endpoint cleanup alone. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legitimate tools made malicious activity harder to separate from normal operations:<\/strong> PowerShell, AutoIt, Windows utilities, trusted applications, and cloud services helped attackers hide inside familiar system activity. This increased the risk of delayed containment, unnecessary escalations, and longer investigations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Changing infrastructure weakened indicator-only defenses:<\/strong> Several campaigns rotated domains, command-and-control servers, or delivery paths. Blocking one URL or IP address could stop only a small part of the operation, while related activity continued elsewhere. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Incomplete context increased response costs:<\/strong> A clean initial verdict, a legitimate first-stage URL, or one isolated alert did not always reveal the full compromise. Without a clear view of affected accounts, stolen data, persistence, and follow-on activity, leaders could underestimate business exposure or approve containment actions that were either too narrow or unnecessarily disruptive. <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n

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